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Abstract
While the global increase of expatriate dual citizenship acceptance over the past dec-
ades has been widely observed, the temporal and spatial contexts of this trend have
remained understudied. Based on a novel data set of expatriate dual citizenship poli-
cies worldwide since 1960, we find that dual citizenship toleration has increased in the
last half century from one-third to three-quarter of states globally. We argue that these
domestic policy changes should be understood in light of normative pressure in a
world where restrictions on individual choice in citizenship status are increasingly
contested and where liberalisation is reinforced through interdependence and dias-
pora politics. We apply Cox proportional hazard models to examine dual citizenship
liberalisation and find that states are more likely to move to a tolerant policy if neigh-
bouring states have done so and that they tend to do so in conjunction with extending
voting rights to citizens residing abroad and receiving remittances from abroad.
Contrary to other studies, we do not observe significant variation by regime type.
Keywords: political science, international relations, geography
1. Introduction
In line with a traditionally restrictive approach to dual citizenship, in a substantial number
of states across the world, citizens automatically lose their citizenship upon the voluntary
acquisition of another citizenship. Yet, the past decades have seen many states change to
tolerant policies, such as Colombia (1991), Finland (2003), Australia (2002), Kenya (2010),
and, most recently, Norway. By 2018, 75 per cent of states in the world accept dual
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citizenship and allow expatriates to acquire destination country citizenship while simul-
taneously maintaining the citizenship of the origin country.
While this trend has been widely observed and commented (Faist 2007; Sejersen 2008;
United Nations 2013: 113; Mirilovic 2015; Spiro 2016), the variable acceptance of dual
citizenship across states has been less well studied. Most commentators will point to factors
that help us understand the broader trend, such as international mobility, gender equality,
and the decreased frequency of interstate armed conflicts that traditionally played into fears
about the consequences of persons having allegiances with multiple states. But, why do
many previously restrictive states now accept dual citizenship, while other states continue
to maintain restrictive policies?
In this article, we argue that the acceptance of expatriate dual citizenship should be
understood in the context of international interdependence and diaspora governance. In
a world where restrictions on choice of citizenship are seen as increasingly arbitrary and
migrants commonly maintain active social, economic, and political transnational links
with their origin country, political elites are increasingly pressured by expatriates to
allow them to naturalise abroad while maintaining a legal link with the origin country.
Both the global trend towards dual citizenship acceptance and especially changes in neigh-
bouring countries become normatively powerful arguments to end national exceptionalism
and to emulate liberalisation elsewhere. As expatriates are increasingly empowered with the
extension of franchise to overseas citizens (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015) and due to the
economic relevance of remittances (Leblang 2017), dual citizenship becomes part and
parcel of a more general diaspora agenda. We empirically test this argument using Cox
proportional hazard models and draw on an original data set capturing expatriate dual
citizenship regulations in nearly all independent states since 1960.
In the remainder of this article, we first discuss the changing international context of dual
citizenship. We then discuss the literature that has addressed cross-national variation and
introduce our argument on interdependence and diaspora governance. In the empirical
part of the article, we introduce our data set and present some descriptive statistics on the
main trend over the past half century. Subsequently, we present the results of hazard models
examining the variation between countries in adhering to the global trend of expatriate dual
citizenship acceptance. We also present a number of specification checks in order to con-
firm the reliability of our main findings and further specify the observed emulation mech-
anisms in various models. We end with a discussion of the broader implications of these
findings.
2. A changing international context
The history of how dual citizenship was long disfavoured under traditional conceptions of
the individual’s relationship to the state, requiring exclusive allegiance on behalf of the
citizen, has been extensively covered in the literature. Dual citizenship represented a source
of international tension in relation to which state can claim diplomatic protection of per-
sons holding citizenship of two or more states, as well as with regard to the presumptively
divided loyalties of dual citizens in case of conflicts between states (Spiro 1997: 1414–515).
The prevention of what we term expatriate dual citizenship, that is, the phenomenon where
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citizens of one state who reside abroad simultaneously hold the citizenship of another state
is problematised by variety in the rules on acquisition and loss of citizenship (Bauböck et al.
2006) and weak international coordination.
The gradual development of the right to expatriation in the 19th century was a first sig-
nificant step towards tackling the undesirable phenomenon of potentially conflicting alle-
giances. In a next phase, we see the institutionalisation of rules with regard to the loss of
citizenship after a citizen voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another state. The USA, for
example, codified expatriation upon naturalisation in a foreign state in 1907: ‘any American
citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any
foreign state in conformity with its laws’ (cited in Spiro 1997: 1435, fn 99). By 1960, similar
provisions could be found in the citizenship laws of the majority of countries in the world.
Today’s rules in the majority of countries reflect a different, more tolerant approach towards
expatriate dual citizenship than 50 years ago. What has changed? There are at least five distinct
phenomena that work together in favour of this more tolerant global conception of dual
citizenship (cf. Sejersen 2008). First, while birthright remains the main form of attributing
citizenship (Shachar 2009), the idea of citizenship as a choice, rather than an innate status,
becomes increasingly accepted. This ‘individual rights’ approach relates not only to acquisition,
but also to loss of citizenship, as underlined when the US Supreme Court decided that
Americans will be expatriated only if they specifically intend to do so; but not automatically
as a result of acquiring a foreign citizenship (Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 1967). Secondly,
discrimination between men and women with regard to citizenship acquisition has become less
acceptable. Persons involved in mixed marriages increasingly will have the possibility to acquire
the spouse’s citizenship through regular or facilitated naturalisation, without losing the citizen-
ship of origin, while their children will often hold multiple citizenships automatically at birth. As
a result, dual citizenship becomes increasingly prevalent, irrespective of restrictive legislation.
Thirdly, as a result of diversifying international migration (Czaika and de Haas 2014), more
origin states face pressures from expatriates who wish to acquire the citizenship of these prime
destination countries. Fourthly, as economic development and democratisation have led to
fewer intra-state conflicts, the idea of dual allegiances provides increasingly less grounds for
concerns. Fifthly, in a ‘post-national’ world where rights are increasingly defined at supra-
national levels and are no longer exclusive to citizens of states, the idea that a nation-state can
demand an exclusive relationship from its members becomes increasingly hollow (Soysal
1994). As a result of these five trends, dual citizenship no longer carries the ‘polygamous’
suspicion that it once was attributed (Spiro 1997: 1430, 1416). Given that these trends are
both difficult to quantify and highly collinear, we do not develop individual hypotheses for
each of these factors. Rather, we expect to observe their combined relevance as a period effect
in our empirical analysis in the sense that states will be more likely to move to a tolerant dual
citizenship policy during the more recent years of our observation period (H1). We discuss
the operationalisation of a dummy variable capturing this period effect in Section 4.
3. Interdependence and diaspora governance
In a normative context where the restriction of citizenship to a formal connection with one
country only seems outdated, a global trend towards expatriate dual citizenship acceptance
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is unsurprising. Yet the extent to which expatriate dual citizenship is accepted is variable
both in terms of the occurrence and the timing of policy changes. Remarkably, virtually all
scholars aiming to explain variation in dual citizenship acceptance do so on the basis of
functional models where political, economic, and demographic attributes of individual
countries explain increasing dual citizenship acceptance (Itzigsohn 2000; Dahlin and
Hironaka 2008; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Mirilovic 2015). Essentially, societal mod-
ernisation is seen as the driving force of dual citizenship acceptance in these perspectives
(cf. Wotipka and Ramirez 2008: 315–16). Such studies overlook one crucial element,
namely that the changing normative context underlying the global trend implies that
policy decisions in one country are not independent in space and time but are conditioned
by those made in other countries at other points in time.
The phenomenon where ‘government policy decisions in a given country are systemat-
ically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries’ (Simmons et al. 2006:
787) is traditionally labelled as international diffusion. Such diffusion processes have been
observed in domains, such as social and economic governance (Gilardi 2010: 660), demo-
cratisation (Gleditsch and Ward 2006), and, here most relevant, diaspora enfranchisement
(Lafleur 2015; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015), diaspora institutions (Gamlen 2014), as well as in
some qualitative studies on changing dual citizenship policies (Escobar 2007: 51–5; Sejersen
2008: 536; Whitaker 2011: 759). Leblang (2017: 90–93), in an analysis where the primary
focus is on the independent effect of dual citizenship on remittances, has provided a first
empirical indication of diffusion in expatriate dual citizenship acceptance. In this article,
we build on this literature and provide both a theoretical account of the diffusion of
expatriate dual citizenship and, subsequently, a systematic empirical test.
3.1 Emulation of global and regional norms
Our account of expatriate dual citizenship acceptance focuses on what, on the related topic
of diaspora enfranchisement, Turcu and Urbatsch (2015: 414) have termed ‘direct emula-
tion’ and Lafleur (2015: 846) ‘norm internationalization’. Emulation ‘means that some
policies gain legitimacy and are socially constructed as appropriate solutions to given
problems’ (Gilardi 2010: 661). In light of an increasingly favourable global template, pol-
icymakers respond to calls by the diaspora emphasising how expatriates can contribute,
economically and politically, to the development of their home country if they are allowed
to retain (or regain) their citizenship of origin while naturalising abroad (Haitian Congress
PAC 2009). Yet, sentiments against dual citizenship are easily mobilised, among those
populations of home countries who are ‘left behind’. As a result, dual citizenship becomes
a contested phenomenon and a battleground for the political acceptance of migration more
generally (Vink et al 2019).
International migrants play a key role in such processes by acting as ‘agents of diffusion’
(Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010) as they are ‘well-positioned to learn from other coun-
tries’ policies’ (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015: 413). For example, in Sweden, the expatriate
community ‘played an important role in the acceptance of dual citizenship, and had a big
influence on the debate preceding the acceptance’ (Bernitz 2012: 11; cf. Spang 2007). In
Mexico, organisations of Mexicans abroad have been ‘very vocal in their demands for
official recognition’ (Hoyo 2015: 9) and ‘[p]roponents of dual nationality invoked its
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acceptance by more than 50 countries’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 184). In these and similar reform
campaigns over the past decades, the changing global approach presents a forceful norma-
tive argument for liberal proponents in the sense that a continuing restrictive policy is
framed as an ‘outdated’ approach and countries refusing to accept the ‘new reality’ are
pictured as ‘lagging behind’ the global trend. In line with the expectations of world society
theory (Meyer et al. 1997), as more states tolerate expatriate dual citizenship, this trend puts
pressure on political elites and electorates and accepting dual citizenship increasingly be-
comes part of a ‘shared policy repertoire [as] something that is expected by emigrants and
states alike’ (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 599).
Policy changes in neighbouring countries in particular can be expected to be especially
influential as countries sharing cultural, economic, and political affinities serve as a more
appropriate reference category in home country political discourse, compared to those
countries that are geographically distant (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Turcu and
Urbatsch 2015: 413). In other words, the ‘triumph of a set of ideas’ (Wotipka and
Ramirez 2008: 312) spreads through isomorphism of geographically contiguous countries.
Escobar observes this process of emulation within the context of Latin America, where
changes in many countries followed up on each other within the span of a decade or so: ‘We
need to take into account that regional diffusion (. . .) was a contributing factor because the
countries that established dual citizenship early served as examples and, in some instances,
as providers of direct advice to the other countries’ (Escobar 2007: 51–2). In Scandinavia,
the early lead of Sweden (accepting dual citizenship in 2001) and an expected change in
Norway (which did not materialise at the time, as dual citizenship was only accepted by the
end of 2018) explicitly encouraged Finland in the direction of a similar reform in 2003
(Fagerlund and Brander 2013: 12). Whitaker (2011: 779) indicates that also in Africa,
though understudied, diffusion effects are likely increasingly relevant as more African
countries recognise dual citizenship (cf. Manby 2016: 73–9).
Of course, states can both liberalise and restrict dual citizenship, and all policy changes
need not be unidirectional. There are certainly some examples of ‘back-sliding’ states with
previously tolerant policies that at some point during our observation period change to a
restrictive policy, such as most recently the restrictive turn in Slovakia in 2011 in response
to expansive changes to the citizenship law in neighbouring Hungary (Bauböck 2010a). Yet
in line with Lee and Strang (2006: 907), who argue that what kind of policy changes are
politically ‘contagious’ depends on what is the norm in different historical periods, we
assume that back-sliding to restrictive approach to dual citizenship are not equally influ-
ential across borders as changes to a tolerant approach, especially not when dual citizenship
becomes globally acceptable in the recent period.
We thus expect to observe a temporal sequence where recent nearby changes towards a
toleration of expatriate dual citizenship increase the propensity to tolerate expatriate dual
citizenship in states that hitherto held a restrictive approach to dual citizenship (H2).
3.2 The political and economic context of diffusion
Policy emulation does not take place in a political vacuum. There are two reasons why we
should consider additional factors. First, besides diffusion, it is likely that other factors
related to diaspora politics, independently or in conjunction with norm emulation, push
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for dual citizenship liberalisation. After all, we find that some countries move earlier than
others towards a tolerant regime, even within geographic regions. For example, nearly all
South American countries have moved towards a tolerant dual citizenship regime since the
early 1990s. Yet, there is a significant gap between the introduction of expatriate dual
citizenship in frontrunners Colombia (1991), Peru (1993), Brazil (1994), and, on the
other hand, in latecomers such as Bolivia (2004) and Chile (2005) (Escobar 2007: 54;
Acosta 2016: 13–14). We argue that an analysis of the diffusion of expatriate dual citizen-
ship acceptance should consider three factors as having an impact on diaspora rights ac-
ceptance: external franchise, regime type, and received remittances. These factors build on
the existing literature, yet have so far not been systematically investigated within a longi-
tudinal perspective that takes interdependence into account. Secondly, these factors allow
us to investigate the extent to which the political and/or economic context is systematically
related to diffusion, for example, by conditioning the extent to which countries are prone to
follow the lead of frontrunners in the geographic neighbourhood. In other words, taking
into account these explanatory factors will help us better understand the underlying mech-
anism of norm emulation.
We first consider electoral rights, in particular the question whether citizens of a country
who reside abroad have the right to participate in national legislative elections. Our rea-
soning here is straightforward. Dual citizenship reform arises often as a consequence of
political demands by expatriate communities, as in the Swedish (Bernitz 2012: 11; Spang
2007) and Mexican cases (Escobar 2004, 2007; Fitzgerald 2005). Yet the political empower-
ment of expatriate communities depends especially on whether they are enfranchised, and
thus can exercise electoral influence from abroad. Whereas traditionally in most polities
voting has been restricted to resident citizens only, there is a clear trend towards extending
suffrage to citizens residing abroad (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). Hence, our expectation is
that states where expatriate citizens have been recently enfranchised are more likely to move
towards a tolerant dual citizenship regime (H3a).
In addition to diaspora enfranchisement having a direct relation with dual citizenship
change, one could argue that politically empowered expats act as norm entrepreneurs and
thus condition the impact of policy diffusion. If diaspora communities push for liberal-
isation in the wake of changes affecting other diaspora groups, especially those from geo-
graphically related origin groups, the recent extension of voting from abroad should
strengthen the impact of diffusion. In other words, we expect that recent changes in neigh-
bouring states towards toleration of expatriate dual citizenship increase the propensity to
tolerate expatriate dual citizenship especially in countries that recently have extended ex-
ternal voting rights (H3b).
We also consider the political regime type of a country. In authoritarian systems, citizens
residing abroad may do so out of dissatisfaction with the current region, or may even be
forced to flee and reside abroad as political refugee. Hence, those in power in authoritarian
regimes are likely to be insensitive to political demands from the diaspora to extend dual
citizenship or even politically motivated to ‘resist’ (Mirilovic 2015: 7) demands that may
strengthen political opposition to the regime. By contrast, Turcu and Urbatsch (2015: 414)
argue that formalistic ways of diaspora incorporation, in their case through external voting
or in our case through dual citizenship extension, may also be employed as a form of
‘competitive signalling’ that helps a state ‘look more democratic, inclusive’.
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From the perspective of democratic systems, as parties are eager to extend their electoral
basis, they are likely not only to support diaspora requests for external franchise (Lafleur
2015: 846) but also for dual citizenship, as being allowed to preserve one’s status as citizen
of a sending state is a precondition for voting from abroad. Whitaker (2011: 777–8) con-
cludes that in the African context the political environment is a key underlying condition
for expatriate dual citizenship acceptance, as she demonstrates on the basis of case studies
of Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Nigeria (even if it does not play out as expected in the latter
case, where dual citizenship was recognized during a period of military rule). Rhodes and
Harutyunyan (2010) put forward the ‘contestation hypothesis’ that higher levels of regime
competition make states more likely to extend citizenship to emigrants (Lafleur (2015)
terms this the ‘electoral competition hypothesis’). Their reasoning is that the norm of
universality inherent to democracy implies that ‘transitions to competitive regimes gen-
erally have been, almost by definition, accompanied the extension of citizenship rights to
more groups’ (471). Following these lines of reasoning, we hypothesise that democracies
in general are more likely to accept dual citizenship (H4). A failure to accept this
hypothesis (i.e. if democracies are not more likely to accept dual citizenship) might be
related to the theoretical expectation that dual citizenship reforms are a form of com-
petitive signalling.
Thirdly, besides their political influence through external franchise, we look at the eco-
nomic power of emigrants. Even if emigration is viewed reluctantly from a home country
perspective (resulting in the institution or continuation of restrictive policies), many send-
ing states eventually recognise the economic value in maintaining the link with the expatri-
ate community (Gamlen 2014). Diasporic communities often emphasise their economic
relevance for domestic economies and from this derive a claim for retaining a formal link
with the origin country. It has been widely argued that recognising their economic rele-
vance has been instrumental in reconceptualising the role of the diaspora. For example,
while a migrant sending state as Mexico originally sought to exercise control over the
diaspora by penalising the acquisition of foreign citizenship with the loss of the citizenship
of origin, now it is recognised that ‘mexicanidad’ can be maintained while acquiring, for
example, US citizenship (Fitzgerald 2009: 33). Research by Leblang (2017) demonstrates
that expatriates from countries extending dual citizenship are more likely to remit than
expatriates from countries that do not provide such right. We assume that this dynamic
also works the other way around, as political elites of countries with high remittances will
aim to avoid being penalised economically for restrictive dual citizenship policies. We thus
expect that higher levels of received remittances will be positively associated with the like-
lihood that a country moves towards accepting dual citizenship (H5).
4. Data and methodology
The data used for our analyses derive from several sources. We present first a data set from
which we derive our dependent variable. We then present descriptive statistics on the main
trend in dual citizenship acceptance. Subsequently, we discuss the operationalisation of
explanatory and control variables and our method of analysis.
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4.1 Dependent variable
The dependent variable is taken from an annually updated and publicly available data set
produced by three of the authors of this paper, covering information on expatriate dual
citizenship in nearly all independent states of the world since 1960 (Vink et al. 2015). The
start year of 1960 was selected in order to allow for a longitudinal analysis during the post-
war period, starting before the major waves of decolonisation and democratisation. In this
article, we use data up to and including 2017, the latest year for which data is comprehen-
sively available on the covariates included in our main models.
While existing data sets include significant conceptual ambiguities (cf. Mirilovic 2015:
9), our data set covers one specific manner in which citizenship can be lost, namely as a
result of voluntarily acquiring another citizenship. In our coding scheme, we distinguish
three main types of national rules, as well as some variations of these three types of rules,
detailed in a codebook that is made available along with the data set. These rules regulate
the legal response in a country to the voluntary acquisition by a citizen of that country of
the citizenship of another country. In the binary coded variable (dualcit_binary) we use as
dependent variable in the analyses of this article, the rule of automatic loss of citizenship in
response to the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship takes the value 0. Most coun-
tries accepting expatriate dual citizenship allow their citizens naturalising elsewhere to
voluntarily renouncing their citizenship of origin. In a minority of states, such as
Morocco or Qatar, voluntary renunciation of citizenship is not possible either and citizens
who acquire another citizenship will always have dual or multiple citizenship. Both types of
rules are essentially tolerant towards dual citizenship and we code these as 1 on our binary
dual citizenship variable.
The countries in our data set can hence be categorized into three groups based on this
dependent variable: (1) countries with already tolerant expatriate dual citizenship policies
in 1960; (2) countries that were restrictive in 1960 but have changed towards a tolerant
policy by 2017; and (3) countries that have remained restrictive since 1960. Note that for
countries that became independent after 1960 we observe their dual citizenship policy since
the year of independence. Supplementary Table A1 lists these three groups, including the
year of change for countries in the middle group.1
Figure 1 shows a strong trend towards acceptance of expatriate dual citizenship in the past
half century. While less than 40 per cent of all countries that existed in 1960 accepted dual
citizenship, this percentage increases steadily to over 70 per cent of countries in 2017. This
trend took place in all regions around the world, though more forcefully in some than in
others. On the American content, in 1960 both the USA and Canada did not accept expatriate
dual citizenship and more than half of the countries in Central and South America applied a
rule of automatic loss upon the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship.
By 2017, however, dual citizenship is fully accepted in North America and in almost all
countries in Central and South America. Nearly the same pattern can be seen in Oceania. In
Europe, the change from restrictive attitudes towards dual citizenship to dual citizenship
tolerance follows the global trend, with 47 per cent of states having tolerant policies in 1960
to over 70 per cent in 2017. The percentages of countries accepting dual citizenship in 2017
are lower in Africa and Asia, though even there a comfortable majority of states allows its
citizens naturalised elsewhere to retain their citizenship of origin.2
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Figure 2 further explores this trend by outlining the policy changes since 1960. Whereas
23 per cent of countries never allowed dual citizenship and 44 per cent always allowed dual
citizenship, altogether in 32 per cent of the countries a change in the policy occurred since
1960. We count 75 changes on our binary dependent variable. An overwhelming 64 changes
(85 per cent) presented a liberalisation of citizenship policies. Providing first descriptive
evidence for our ‘period effect’ hypothesis (H1), most changes took place in the 1990s and
2000s, especially in Latin America (one-third of all changes), followed by Africa and Europe
(one-quarter of all changes each). In addition to changing policies, we observe that among
the 103 countries that became independent after 1960, they are more likely to adopt a dual
tolerant citizenship to start with when it became fashionable globally. While old countries
have institutional histories to defend, new countries are especially exposed to a changing
global template. Among the 68 countries that became independent during the first half of
the observation period, the number of countries starting with restrictive and tolerant
policies is not very different, respectively, 36 (53 per cent) and 32 (47 per cent). Among
the 35 countries becoming independent after 1988, however, only six (17 per cent) start
with a restrictive policy whereas 29 (83 per cent) start with a tolerant policy.
In order to systematically test H1 as well as control for a period effect (i.e. the increasing
likelihood of states having liberal dual citizenship policies around the world in), we add a
dummy variable to all models that splits the total observation period 1960–2017 in two
periods of 29 years: in two periods: 1960–87 and 1988–2017. While this is admittedly a
crude periodisation, based on our descriptive statistics (Figs 1 and 2) the main trend
Figure 1. Percentage of countries accepting expatriate dual citizenship, 1960–2017, globally and
by world region.
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towards dual citizenship acceptance begins in the late 1980s and thus best captures the
changed international environment as discussed in Section 2.3
To test our expectations around regional diffusion, we measure dual citizenship accept-
ance in nearby countries, defined as those with a minimum distance between the borders of
500km or less (cf. Gleditsch and Ward 2006: 922), or as one of three closest countries (in
order to capture diffusion between island nations located more than 500 km away from the
nearest neighbouring country). We expect that nearby dual citizenship acceptance does not
have an immediate, but rather a delayed effect on the propensity to tolerate expatriate dual
citizenship in states that hitherto held a restrictive approach to dual citizenship. Hence, we
measure nearby dual citizenship acceptance in the past three years.4 We include a series of
alternative operationalisations for this variable and present robustness analyses in Section 6
to check whether and how these measures matter for the outcome of our analyses.
Data measuring the extension of voting rights to expatriates are taken from the ‘Voting
from Abroad Database’ provided by the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA 2016). Data on political regime type were taken from the V-
Dem data set (Coppedge et al. 2018) using the ‘v2x_regime’ variable recoded as a dummy
for electoral democracy. Among existing longitudinal data sets on regime type, V-Dem has
a better geographical coverage than the Polity IV data set, the main alternative measure-
ment of regime type (Marshall et al. 2016).5 Moreover, V-Dem should be expected to do a
better job in discriminating ‘real’ from ‘fake’ democracies, primarily where de facto prac-
tices deviate from de jure standards (Lührmann et al. 2018: 71). To measure the economic
significance of emigration for domestic economies of origin countries, we use data on
received remittances from the World Development Indicators produced by the World
Bank (Arel-Bundock 2018). Since data availability for this variable is considerably more
limited in geographical and temporal scope than our other variables, we present analyses
including remittances in separate models. Data on total population size of a country and
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in current US$) are also from the World Bank.
We use natural logarithms to account for the exponential distribution of these variables.
Supplementary Table A2 provides descriptive statistics.
4.3 Method
Given the longitudinal structure of our data set, we apply a Cox proportional hazards
model in order to analyse the time that passes before countries accept expatriate dual
citizenship. We thus conceive moving from restrictive to liberal expatriate dual citizenship
Figure 2. Changes in acceptance of expatriate dual citizenship, 1960–2017.
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policy in terms of survival analysis as a ‘failure’ and estimate the survival rates of restrictive
policies. To do so we structure our data set by including only countries that do not accept
dual citizenship in 1960 or that become independent after 1960 and do not accept dual
citizenship at the moment of independence. We also include back-sliding countries in our
main analyses from the time they had restrictive policy, that is, those countries that at some
point after 1960 have moved from a tolerant to a restrictive dual citizenship policy. These
countries were again ‘at risk’ of moving back to a tolerant policy.6 This data set includes 102
countries and 55 ‘failures’, that is, changes to expatriate dual citizenship acceptance, and a
maximum of 4,002 country-year observations.7
Some remarks on the data structure in light of the hazards models. First, ‘duration’ in
our analysis measures the number of years of having restrictive dual citizenship policies,
either since 1960 or since the moment of independence of a country. The maximum dur-
ation is 58 years. While, at the starting point of our observations, 1960, almost all countries
in existence in that year already existed longer, we assume that before this period the ‘risk’
for traditionally restrictive countries to change to tolerant expatriate dual citizenship
policies was limited. Hence, the duration of these restrictive policies before 1960 is, in
our view, largely irrelevant and mostly associated with length of existence of a country. Yet
we include a control to check whether it matters whether a state already existed before 1960
or only becomes independent afterwards. Secondly, the data set is right-censored since
some countries exit the data set without a ‘failure’ having occurred if they cease to be
independent before 2017 or where no ‘failure’ occurred before the end of the empirical
observation period. Cox proportional hazard models predict the probability that a country
will adopt a dual citizenship policy, assuming that even if the ‘event’ of changing to dual
citizenship acceptance has not yet occurred by the end of our empirical observations, there
is a real risk that this will happen in the future.
5. Findings
Table 1 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazards models for the likelihood of
countries that previously had a restrictive policy towards expatriate dual citizenship
moving to a tolerant dual citizenship policy. We present here five models, starting with
our main model (Model 1) and a model that includes an interaction between diffusion and
voting from abroad (Model 2). Models 3 and 4 are run on fewer observations due to data
limitations for the variable ‘received remittances’. To check whether data availability affects
the main results, Model 3 is first run on this selection without remittances; subsequently,
Model 4 adds the remittances variable (and controls for population and GDP per capita).
The results of Model 1 show, first, that the recent adoption of dual citizenship by a
neighbouring country increases the probability to accept expatriate dual citizenship. This
confirms our main diffusion hypothesis (H2). Secondly, we find that the recent extension
of external franchise is positively and significantly related to the odds of extending dual
citizenship to expatriates. This suggests that dual citizenship extension is driven by, or at
least associated with, a diaspora engagement agenda where the influence of politically active
expatriates may be strengthened by their enfranchisement (H3a). One should be careful in
interpreting these findings in causal terms, however, as, first, a diaspora may be







igration/article-abstract/7/3/362/5488849 by guest on 22 Septem
ber 2019
enfranchised, but not politically active and, secondly, formal acceptance of external voting
need not imply that such rights can also be exercised in practice. A study of Latin America
and the Caribbean found that many variations of electoral rights, types, and venues of
representation of emigrants are observable (Palop-Garcı́a and Pedroza 2017). For example,
in Mexico, it took a decade for external voting, formally adopted by Congress in 1996, to
take effect (Cano and Delano 2007: 713). When adding the interaction between the pres-
ence of external voting and diffusion (Model 2), we find that emulation of recent changes to
dual citizenship acceptance in neighbouring countries is not significantly conditioned by
the recent enfranchisement of the diaspora (H3b). Hence, while our findings show the need
to consider both dual citizenship acceptance and external voting as elements of an inte-
grated diaspora inclusion agenda, we find no evidence that external franchise conditions
diffusion (see also a specification check of the temporal sequence in Section 6).
Thirdly, and contrary to what we hypothesized following Rhodes and Harutyunyan
(2010) and Whitaker (2011), we cannot confirm that democracies are more likely to
move to a tolerant dual citizenship policy. Even though the coefficient is positive, the
large confidence intervals indicate that the effect of democracy cannot be determined
Table 1. Likelihood of expatriate dual citizenship acceptance: hazard ratios (standard errors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recent nearby dual citizenship acceptance 2.71 2.98 2.99 2.98
(0.88) (1.02) (1.00) (1.02)
Recent voting from abroad extension 3.48 4.18 3.91 3.85
(1.45) (1.91) (1.68) (1.67)
Recent nearby dual citizenship acceptance 0.41
# Recent voting from abroad extension (0.48)
Log remittances received 1.25
(0.11)
Electoral democracy 1.22 1.22 0.97 0.77
(0.35) (0.35) (0.30) (0.29)
Recent period 3.09 3.10 2.32 1.92
(1.63) (1.63) (1.33) (1.10)
Independence post-1960 0.96 0.97 0.82 0.69
(0.31) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28)
Log-likelihood 217 217 175 170
N (observations) 4,002 4,002 2,273 2,273
N (countries) 102 102 94 94
N (events) 55 55 49 49
Including back-sliding countries Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Model 4 controls for population size and GDP per capita (results not shown).
p< 0.05; p< 0.01 (two-tailed).
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with certainty. The latter finding chimes with evidence on the relationship between dem-
ocratisation and diaspora engagement, which is mixed at best (Rhodes and Harutyunyan
2010; Lafleur 2015: 848). Turcu and Urbatsch (2015: 425), on external franchise extension,
suggest that autocratic states may ‘exploit this norm to feign being good democratic citi-
zens’ but will find ways to avoid risking regime-threatening electoral participation by an
enfranchised diaspora (p. 428). Similar dynamics can perhaps be found on dual citizenship
extension. This finding suggests that change in line with a broader global trend, and
reinforced by change in the geographic neighbourhood, may well have a stronger signalling
function than express a true commitment to effectively incorporate an active diaspora
within the domestic political arena of the home country.
We graphically illustrate the substantive importance of the changing dual citizenship
policies of neighbouring countries and franchise extension abroad in Fig. 3. The two graphs
plot the survivor function for, respectively, those countries with and those without neigh-
bours recently accepting expatriate dual citizenship (left graph) and those that did and did
not recently extend voting rights to expatriates (right graph). The graphs illustrate two
observations. First, during the early observation years (corresponding with the time period
until the mid-1980s for those states independent in 1960), the likelihood for previously
restrictive policies to survive was high for all countries; until then, the relevance of both
nearby dual citizenship policies and external franchise introduction are limited. This
Figure 3. Probability that a country accepts dual citizenship with nearby recent dual citizenship
change, respectively, recently extended voting from abroad, set as 0 (“No”) or 1 SD above the
mean (“Yes”). Estimates are based on Table 1, Model 1.
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corresponds to what we have observed earlier on the basis of the descriptive analysis,
which showed that the main trend of dual citizenship liberalisation kicks in towards the
end of the 1980s.
Secondly, during the second half of the analysis time period, the differences between the
groups of countries become more substantive. Note that we control for a period effect in
this model, hence these estimates of the relevance of diffusion and diaspora franchise are
additive to the overall increasing likelihood of dual citizenship acceptance (as represented
by the fact that also the bottom lines increase substantially). This chimes with the argument
by Lee and Strang (2006) that neighbourhood diffusion is affected by the wider climate. In
this period, when accepting expatriate dual citizenship generally becomes likelier, countries
whose neighbours have recently moved to dual citizenship are around 50 per cent more
likely to introduce dual citizenship compared to countries without such neighbours. The
same, however, applies to those countries that have recently introduced voting from
abroad, compared to those who have not. The simultaneity and broadly similar magnitude
of the associations between these two variables and dual citizenship change suggest that
they are likely to be understood as two sides of the same coin of a diaspora governance
agenda that both spreads between countries and is reflected in both franchise extension and
dual citizenship acceptance.
These findings thus allow us to broaden the argument from previous research on the
diffusion of the external franchise (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015), by suggesting both that
similar diffusion processes can be identified with regard to dual citizenship acceptance as
well as that franchise extension, dual citizenship acceptance, and nearby change are inex-
tricably linked. Moreover, while in-depth qualitative studies are required to trace the pol-
itical processes behind dual citizenship reforms, these findings allow us to identify possible
typical cases of diffusion, such as, more recently, in Chile (2006; nearby change in Bolivia in
2005), Djibouti (2005; nearby change in Somalia in 2004), Honduras (2003; nearby change
in Nicaragua in 2001), and Luxembourg (2009; nearby change in Belgium in 2008).
Subsequently, Models 3 and 4 present the results of separate analyses where we look at
the association between received remittances and expatriate dual citizenship acceptance.
We present this evidence in separate models due to the limited availability of data on
received remittances. We first re-run Model 1 based on this sub-sample with lower
number of observations (Model 3) and find that the relevance of diffusion and external
franchise is robust across these different sample sizes. Subsequently, we add the variable
measuring remittances and find that, as hypothesized, higher remittances increase the
likelihood for a country to move to tolerant dual citizenship regime (Model 4).8 This
suggests that it is not just a political enfranchised, but also an economically powerful
diaspora that pushes for dual citizenship liberalisation. Our diffusion indicator remains
significant throughout these analyses.
6. Specification and robustness checks
In this section, we discuss the results of a number of specification and robustness checks
with alternative operationalisations of our diffusion variable and external franchise
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variable. These findings are presented in Table 2 (see additional models in Supplementary
Table A3).
In order to compare between models, we first re-run our main model on what is a slightly
lower number of observations (due to different lagged variables) and confirm the stability
of our findings (Model 5). Then we look at two alternative operationalisations of our
diffusion variable and do one robustness check. First, we check whether it makes a differ-
ence whether we measure recent change in the same world region rather than in a neigh-
bouring country (Model 6). We find that diffusion remains positive and significant when
measured at the regional level (but becomes insignificant when looking at regional changes
Table 2. Likelihood of expatriate dual citizenship acceptance: hazard ratios (standard errors)—
alternative model specifications
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)


































Electoral democracy 1.26 1.28 1.28 1.30 1.26 1.28
(0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39)
Recent period 3.23 2.70 3.40 2.63 3.47 2.01
(1.71) (1.46) (1.79) (1.45) (1.83) (1.22)
Independence post-1960 0.95 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.99 1.20
(0.31) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.40)
Log-likelihood 209 210 210 212 211 191
N (observations) 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,848 3,749
N (countries) 102 102 102 102 102 91
N (events) 53 53 53 53 53 49
Including back-sliding countries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
p< 0.05; p< 0.01 (two-tailed).
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in the past five years, Model 12, Supplementary Table A3). Secondly, we measure the mean
dual citizenship policy among neighbouring countries instead of change per se (Model 7).
This helps us determine whether it is the mere existence of tolerant dual citizenship policies
in the geographical neighbourhood that explains policy change in a country (i.e., through
increasing normative pressure) or rather whether emulation is a more dynamic process
where policymakers react to the changing policies of other countries. We find that this
alternative operationalisation also significantly predicts the likelihood of change to a tol-
erant regime. This finding suggests that emulation proceeds through the existence of liberal
policies per se and not exclusively through the normative impact of nearby dual citizenship
reform. Thirdly, we test the robustness of nearby or regional diffusion and run the Cox
model including a variable that measures whether any non-neighbouring country has ac-
cepted dual citizenship in the past three years (Model 8). This variable hence measures the
global acceptance of dual citizenship apart from neighbouring countries and from a dif-
fusion perspective, we would expect such changes to exert less or no normative influence,
beyond what we already pick up by variable controlling for the period effect. We observe a
positive but not significant correlation.
Subsequently, we look at an alternative operationalisation of the external franchise vari-
able in order to identify whether it is actually dual citizenship reform that follows electoral
reform, or vice versa dual citizenship extension that generates calls for extending voting
rights abroad. We aim to tease this out by using a variable measuring whether voting from
abroad will be introduced at any point within the next five years (Model 9). If dual citi-
zenship follows franchise extension, but not the other way around, this could be seen as
evidence for the argument that enfranchisement politically empowers expats who subse-
quently are likely to be more influential in lobbying for dual citizenship change. We find
that the likelihood of dual citizenship acceptance in a given year is not significantly related
to electoral reform within the near future. While this finding does not exclude the possi-
bility that a government predisposed to an integrated diaspora agenda implements both
franchise extension and citizenship liberalisation, rather than a franchised diaspora cam-
paigning for dual citizenship extension, this does suggest a more common sequence within
the politics of diaspora engagement where first voting rights are extended abroad and
subsequently are followed by dual citizenship reform.
Finally, when excluding 11 back-sliding countries from the analysis (Model 10) we find
that this neither affects the significance of diffusion nor of extending franchise abroad.
7. Conclusion
Expatriate dual citizenship toleration increases over time and clusters spatially. Nowadays,
three-quarter of countries accept dual citizenship for expatriates acquiring another citi-
zenship up from less than one-third in 1960; this trend is most pronounced in the
Americas, Oceania, and Europe and, though still noticeable, less strong in Africa and
Asia. Analysing this trend, we find that dual citizenship liberalization reflects an agenda
of modern diaspora governance where expatriates are increasingly viewed as part of a
community that continues to contribute to political and economic development of sending
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states. From this perspective, accepting citizens residing abroad to acquire another citizen-
ship while continuing to hold on to their original citizenship is plausibly associated with
simultaneous trends as extending external franchise and receiving financial remittances.
Increasing expatriate dual citizenship toleration is a largely self-sustaining phenomenon
in a world where not only global migration shows no sign of retreating (Ratha et al. 2016),
but the increasing number of states now accepting expatriate dual citizenship put ever more
normative pressure on those that lag behind. Moreover, reverting back to restrictive dual
citizenship policies from a by now frequently enfranchised and often economically power-
ful diaspora, is politically challenging, as ‘serious disincentives exist to reverse course’ by
taking from emigrants what they meanwhile have become to see as an entitlement (Faist
et al. 2006: 916). In contrast to what is sometimes argued (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010;
Whitaker 2011; Mirilovic 2015), we cannot confirm that democracies are more likely to
move to accepting dual citizenship. In our view, this is support for a view that emphasises
the signalling impact of policy reform, where liberalisation in one country triggers nearby
change in countries that do not want to lag behind.
These findings address the critique of methodological nationalism in citizenship studies
by taking seriously the transnational constellations where citizenship policies have effects
outside national borders and politically active diasporas mobilise across borders (Bauböck
2010b; Collyer 2014). In other words, interdependence matters, even in the nationally
sensitive domain of citizenship. While this article provides an example of how such a
transnational diffusion agenda can be applied in a systematic manner to the study of
citizenship politics, some caveats are in order.
First, our quantitative research strategy is aimed at ‘pattern finding’ (Lee and Strang
2006: 886), but does not provide an exhaustive analysis of possible diffusion mechanisms.
In line with our theoretical expectations we do find both a geographical ordering of dual
citizenship policies, where changes in one country match those in geographically near
countries, as well as a temporal ordering of this covariance, in terms of changes in one
country following those in another country within a certain temporal limit. Yet, our ‘big
picture’ approach, covering a long time period and nearly all existing states in the world,
can only go so far in terms of insights in the micro-political foundations of diffusion
mechanisms. We thus encourage further qualitative research on the drivers behind dual
citizenship acceptance in line with some early case studies in the field (Escobar 2007;
Sejersen 2008; Whitaker 2011). Here the role of international government and non-gov-
ernment organisations would be worth investigating as potential agents driving emulation
or learning (cf. Checkel 1999).
Secondly, we need also to look beyond the surface of converging formal measures of
diaspora engagement and look at the implementation of dual citizenship rights in practice.
As with external voting, where ‘many variations in terms of specific electoral rights, types
and venues of representation of emigrants are observable’ (Palop-Garcia and Pedroza 2017:
1597; Lafleur 2015), we do not exclude that access to expatriate dual citizenship is also
hampered by implementations that may restrict effectively holding on to one’s citizenship
of origin.
Thirdly, expatriate dual citizenship acceptance is but one of the elements of citizenship
policies that have strong external effects (Vink and Bauböck 2013). Of these, the varying
conditions under which emigrants across the world can transmit citizenship to their
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children is the most notable, yet understudied phenomenon; regulations on the loss of
citizenship due to continued residence abroad provide another example where keeping a
formal link with the home country alive depends on varying national institutional contexts.
Analysing the relation between expatriate dual citizenship and external voting, on the one
hand, and formal diaspora institutions such as administrative departments within the
executive branch of government would also be a worthwhile avenue for research on the
practice of external citizenship (cf. Gamlen 2014). By demonstrating one way in which our
data can be analysed based on insights from contemporary discussions in migration studies,
we hope to have provided further inspiration for such studies.
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Notes
1. The codebook accompanying the data set provides full details on relevant legal
provisions.
2. Supplementary Figure A1, displaying the trend based only on those 90 countries that
continuously existed from 1960 to 2017, shows that the trend of dual acceptance is not
just a reflection of the changing number of states.
3. We also ran additional models where we replaced this period dummy by a variable that
captures the percentage of states throughout the world that accepts dual citizenship in a
given year. This produces results broadly similar in direction and significance for the
main variables in the models.
4. We measure this as a change in the current year or the two preceeding years.
Neighbouring countries were identified with data provided by the R package ‘cshapes’,
which provides a function to calculate distances between countries (Weidmann and
Gleditsch 2010).
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5. We do not include additional data on number of emigrants because of the limited
nature of available data on migration stock and flow data. The most comprehensive
available data covers bilateral migrant flows from 178 origin countries but only into 18
destinations and only over the period 1980–2006 (Fitzgerald et al. 2014).
6. Model 10 provides a robustness check for the impact of excluding these back-sliding
countries from the analyses.
7. These numbers refer to Models 1 and 2. Due to missing data for some variables and the
use of lagged variables, the additional models are run on fewer observations.
8. As this is a logged variable, a tenfold increase of remittances increases the probability to
accept expatriate dual citizenship to 25 per cent (Model 4).
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